California Engineering after WWII
The Committee’s report, “Engineering Facts, 1946, and a Future Program”, was 144 pages long, and was staffed by consultant G. Donald Kennedy, of Washington DC (California registered civil engineer #6509). In the cover letter, Mr. Kennedy acknowledged the participation of State Highway Engineer George McCoy and staff, the County Supervisors Association, the League of California Cities, the federal Public Roads Administration, and the Automotive Safety Foundation, among others. Of course, highway demand in California and the nation, while higher in 1946 than before the war, was still affected by wartime conditions, especially travel restrictions and availability of new vehicles. Thus, the data underlying projections of future demand turned out to be too low in foreseeing how highway use would develop here, and what the state might need to do to accommodate it.
The forecasts were about 15,000,000 people in 1980, with 7 million registered vehicles. There were expected to be only 43 vehicles per 100 people in the state. Vehicle miles traveled were estimated at 66 billion in 1980. Then-current federal funding was $9 million for primary highways, $5 million for secondary roads, and $8 million for “municipal improvements”. A major finding was “It will not be feasible or practical to accomplish all construction as proposed in long range plans of all jurisdictions with the time limit of a proposed ten year program”. Some findings reflected poorly on state and local highway funding and programs between the two World Wars. For example, only 66% of the state highway system was paved, and about 5,000 miles had pavement less than 20 feet wide. County roads were in even worse shape: only 10% having a “high type surface”, with “only a small percent” being 20 feet or wider. The “bottom line” was a proposed Ten Year Program providing $111 million annually for construction, maintenance, and administration on the state system, $48 million for counties, and $50 million for cities, with expenditures indexed for inflation. By the end of the 1950s, these amounts were already inadequate and serious efforts were underway to gain a larger funding base even beyond the Interstate System which was created in 1956. A “State Expressway System” was suggested, consisting of only about 2,900 miles, leaving 8,500 miles in a “State Trunkline System”. Certain transfers of jurisdiction between the state and local agencies were recommended, while only 3,800 miles of city streets were suggested as being of “Major Importance”. New rights of way for the Expressway System were recommended to have no abutting access and be sufficient for “future needs”. (The first was generally achieved, but as we now know, the latter often was not.) The Expressway System looked somewhat like our current net of freeways, but much smaller. The only major intercity routes in Northern California were from the Bay Area to Reno, Fremont to Stockton, Los Angeles to the Oregon line, and San Jose to Los Angeles, all following the then existing alignments. (No freeway on 101 north of Marin County.) Within the Bay Area, the Bayshore and Nimitz were included, along with a strange loop in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties from Oakland to around Concord and then back to Richmond. Expressway recommendations for Southern California were more extensive, especially in the deserts east of the Los Angeles area, likely a reflection of the political clout of that area which still exists. Of special interest to civil engineers was a recommendation that all counties should have full-time qualified engineers in charge of road administration. This was eventually done, but not without considerable political stress involving the traditional Road Commissioner positions.
One recommendation continues to be controversial and difficult to achieve: more off street parking in cities to prevent the “wasteful use” of highway and street surfaces. All of this was before the unanticipated rapid expansion of California’s population and travel demands so that within a few years, the main findings were greatly out of date. It remains today a difficult challenge for engineers to make realistic future needs projections.
The forecasts were about 15,000,000 people in 1980, with 7 million registered vehicles. There were expected to be only 43 vehicles per 100 people in the state. Vehicle miles traveled were estimated at 66 billion in 1980. Then-current federal funding was $9 million for primary highways, $5 million for secondary roads, and $8 million for “municipal improvements”. A major finding was “It will not be feasible or practical to accomplish all construction as proposed in long range plans of all jurisdictions with the time limit of a proposed ten year program”. Some findings reflected poorly on state and local highway funding and programs between the two World Wars. For example, only 66% of the state highway system was paved, and about 5,000 miles had pavement less than 20 feet wide. County roads were in even worse shape: only 10% having a “high type surface”, with “only a small percent” being 20 feet or wider. The “bottom line” was a proposed Ten Year Program providing $111 million annually for construction, maintenance, and administration on the state system, $48 million for counties, and $50 million for cities, with expenditures indexed for inflation. By the end of the 1950s, these amounts were already inadequate and serious efforts were underway to gain a larger funding base even beyond the Interstate System which was created in 1956. A “State Expressway System” was suggested, consisting of only about 2,900 miles, leaving 8,500 miles in a “State Trunkline System”. Certain transfers of jurisdiction between the state and local agencies were recommended, while only 3,800 miles of city streets were suggested as being of “Major Importance”. New rights of way for the Expressway System were recommended to have no abutting access and be sufficient for “future needs”. (The first was generally achieved, but as we now know, the latter often was not.) The Expressway System looked somewhat like our current net of freeways, but much smaller. The only major intercity routes in Northern California were from the Bay Area to Reno, Fremont to Stockton, Los Angeles to the Oregon line, and San Jose to Los Angeles, all following the then existing alignments. (No freeway on 101 north of Marin County.) Within the Bay Area, the Bayshore and Nimitz were included, along with a strange loop in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties from Oakland to around Concord and then back to Richmond. Expressway recommendations for Southern California were more extensive, especially in the deserts east of the Los Angeles area, likely a reflection of the political clout of that area which still exists. Of special interest to civil engineers was a recommendation that all counties should have full-time qualified engineers in charge of road administration. This was eventually done, but not without considerable political stress involving the traditional Road Commissioner positions.
One recommendation continues to be controversial and difficult to achieve: more off street parking in cities to prevent the “wasteful use” of highway and street surfaces. All of this was before the unanticipated rapid expansion of California’s population and travel demands so that within a few years, the main findings were greatly out of date. It remains today a difficult challenge for engineers to make realistic future needs projections.
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